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This paper examines the effect of competition on the irreversible investment decisions 
under uncertainty as a generalization of the “real option” approach. We examine this 
issue with reference to an industry where each firm has only one investment opportunity 
which is completely irreversible and the product market reveals an inverted U-shape 
relationship between firm profits and industry size. That is, there are positive 
externalities for low level of the market size and negative externalities at high level of 
the market size. In the latter case, which corresponds to the traditional competitive 
industries, firms invest sequentially as market profitability develops. In the former case, 
which corresponds to industries in which investments are mutually beneficial, firms 
invest simultaneously after profitability of the market has developed sufficiently to 
capture all network benefits and to recover the option value of waiting. Put together,  
these extensions of the “real option” analysis, with strategic interactions, may help to 
explain both the cases of rapid and sudden developments such as the recent internet 
investments and the cases of prolonged start-up problems while waiting for the market 
to develop as the story of fax machines shows. 
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Investment is de￿ned as the act of incurring an immediate cost in the ex-
pectation of future payoﬀ. However, when the immediate cost is sunk (at
least partially) and there is uncertainty over future rewards, the timing of
the investment decision becomes crucial (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p.3). In
particular it is shown that irreversibility and uncertainty induce the ￿rm to
invest optimally only when the value of the investment exceeds the value of
the option of waiting before making the irreversible decision.
This paper extends the above standard irreversible investment model,
taking strategic interactions into account. We deal speci￿cally with the case
w h e r eal a r g en u m b e ro fi d e n t i c a l￿r m sa r ee n g a g e di na ni n v e s t m e n tg a m e
to enter a new product market and analyse the eﬀect of competition on the
optimal investment strategy of the ￿r m s . W ee x a m i n et h i si s s u ew i t hr e f -
erence to an industry where each ￿rm has only one investment opportunity
which is completely irreversible and the product market reveals an inverted
U-shape relationship between ￿rm pro￿ts and industry size: that is, posi-
tive externalities tend to dominate for low initial market size levels, whereas
negative externalities tend to dominate at higher market size levels.
Although we do not refer in the paper to a particular product, there are
many markets that show, at least for some dimensions, greater pro￿tability
when more then one ￿rm has already invested. This situation could arise
in the case of goods that exhibit ￿network externalities￿ so that the utility
of each consumer increases as the total number of consumers purchasing the
same or compatible brands increases.1 One of many examples concerns the
decision by multiple rival ￿rms to set up an interconnected network to satisfy
an interdependent demand for telecommunication services by a signi￿cant
number of potential customers (Rohlfs, 2001, p. 34). A diﬀerent case is
when a high degree of complementarity between diﬀerent goods is present
as for software and hardware. Generally, software packages are produced by
a large number of ￿rms so that they can be used by the same hardware.
Thus the greater the variety of software supporting a certain hardware, the
greater the value of this hardware and the greater the utility consumers derive
directly from the variety of software supporting the speci￿ch a r d w a r e .S o m e
1Jeﬀrey H. Rohlfs coined the term bandwagon eﬀect for the bene￿tt h a tap e r s o ne n j o y s
as a result of others￿ doing the same thing that he or she does, and speci￿cally he used
the term network externalities for the bandwagon eﬀect that applies to the user set of a
comunication network (Rholfs, 2001)
3authors refer to this as ￿indirect network externalities￿ (Shy, 2001, p.52) or
￿complementary bandwagon eﬀects￿ (Rohlfs, 2001, p. 47-48 ). In other cases,
the utility of each consumer decreases as more consumers buy the good. This
occurs because of congestion, as the communication and information-based
industries are recently experiencing. If on one hand the introduction of a new
Web site increases the value of Internet to every existing user, on the other
hand the progressive increase of its use increases congestion measured in
term of excessive delay of transmission (longer connection time spent to load
a Web page) or loss of service altogether (Odlyzko, 1999). Congestion then
reduces consumers￿ utility of joining the Internet and passes this dis-bene￿t
to the ￿rms by reducing the demand of access.2
The negative externalities case, with or without congestion, corresponds
to the traditional competitive industry in which the investment of one ￿rm
lowers the pro￿tability of the others. In this case the introduction of compe-
tition has two opposing eﬀects which annul each other. Firstly, competition
reduces the expected pro￿t ￿ow that derives from the investment which tends
to delay investment. Secondly, competition introduces a strategic bene￿ti n
favour of the investment as it deters the investments by rivals. Leahy (1993)
￿rst discovered this property showing that the optimal investment strategy
of a competitive ￿rm remains equal to that of a single ￿rm in isolation. In
this case, ￿rms enter sequentially as market pro￿tability increases.
On the contrary, in the case where investments are mutually bene￿cial,
the optimal investment policy is essentially a question of coordination. As the
timing of a ￿rm￿s entry is in￿uenced by the entry decisions of others, Leahy￿s
result cannot be applied. Two equilibriums can emerge: either the industry
remains locked-in with no entry as long as very pessimistic expectations
dominate the market, or a mass of ￿rms simultaneously runs to enter, driven
by the expected rents generated by the positive externalities.3 Excluding the
former for the sake of subgame-perfectness, we show that the level of market
pro￿tability that triggers these ￿rms￿ ￿network run￿ is the same as the one
that justi￿es the entry of the ￿rst ￿rm under negative externalities. In other
words, the ￿rms make their decision simultaneously when the pro￿tability of
the market has developed suﬃciently to capture all bandwagon bene￿ts and
2See, for example, DaSilva (2000) and Falkner et al. (2000), for a sarvey on the litera-
ture on how to price congestible networks as Internet.
3This is what Rohlfs (2001, p.16-17) de￿nes a chicken-egg problem: nobody joins the
network because the size of the network is zero, but the size of the network is nul because
no one has joined it.
4to recover the option value of waiting due to the irreversibility. This also
determines endogenously the optimal start-up size of the industry.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
states the main results of the paper, namely the optimal entry strategy in
the presence of positive and negative externalities. Section 3 deals with the
coordination equilibrium induced by positive externalities using a discrete-
time game. The approach of this section is left at a heuristic level to highlight
the link between a single ￿rm￿s decision and the bene￿ts of coordinating
investment. The formal analysis for pure strategies is presented in section
4 showing the conditions according to which, given the other ￿rms￿ policy
of entry, no individual ￿rm ￿nds it optimal to follow a diﬀerent policy. By
the continuous time representation we show that the optimal policy is also
subgame perfect. Section 5 applies the main results to the decision of building
up a competitive network for satisfying a demand for telecommunication
services and section 6 places the paper in the context of the literature on
irreversible investment and market structure. Finally section 7 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider the decision to enter a new market subject to uncertain returns
by a large number of identical ￿rms. Yet, in order to focus exclusively on the
timing decisions we abstain from explicitly characterizing the product market
decisions (price or quantity), the ￿rm size and, in line with this approach,
we assume that the entry costs required to initiate the technology projects
are given. This is summarized by the following assumptions:
Assumptions
1. At any time t an idle ￿rm may decide to enter a new market. Firms
are risk-neutral and discount the future returns at the riskless interest
rate ρ.4
2. All ￿rms are identical and their size dm is in￿nitesimally small with
respect to the market.
4Introducing risk aversion does not change the results since the analysis can be devel-
oped under a risk neutral probability measure (Cox and Ross, 1976; Harrison and Kreps,
1979).
53. Each ￿rm can enter by committing forever to a ￿ow cost w or under-
taking a single irreversible investment which requires an initial sunk
cost K = w/ρ.
4. Firms are free to enter. That is, in the free-entry game the ￿rms ￿rst
decide whether or not to enter (and pay the entry cost K)a n dt h e n
compete for the available rents (generated by the positive externalities).
Since entry is irreversible the ￿r m sa l r e a d yi nt h em a r k e td on o th a v e
other decisions to make.
5. Each ￿rm has zero operating options.5
6. Indicating by mt = m the number of ￿rms currently active at time t
(incumbents), each of them yields a ￿ow of operating pro￿ts that we
abbreviate as:
π(m,θ) ≡ u(m)θ (1)
where θ is an industry-speci￿cs h o c k .T i m ei sc o n t i n u o u s ,t ∈ [0,∞),
and suppressed if not necessary.
7. The function u(m) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in m,a n di ti s
increasing over the interval [0, ﬂ m) and decreasing thereafter (see ￿gure
1). That is, there are positive externalities to investment which can
be caused by ￿network externalities￿ or the fact that the ￿rms produce
complementary products, over [0, ﬂ m).A f t e rﬂ m it is better for any single
￿rm that the others have not invested: competition and/or congestion
occur. We also assume that at zero and at some ￿nite number of ￿rms
M (M >> ﬂ m), pro￿ts falls to zero, i.e. u(0) = 0, and u(M)=0 , what-
ever the value of θ. As M could be arbitrarily large, this assumption is
harmless in our setting.
Figure 1 about here
8. Finally, the industry-speci￿cs h oc kθ follows a geometric diﬀusion process:
dθ = αθdt + σθdW with θ0 = θ and α,σ > 0. (2)
5This assumption allows us to focus on when, rather than whether, the entry takes
place. The most important operating option is the ability of the ￿rm to reduce output or
even shut down and thereby avoid variable costs. The presence of operating options raises
the value of the ￿rm, see MacDonald and Siegel (1985) and, for a thorough discussion,
Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chs. 6 and 7).
6Applying It￿￿s Lemma to (1) and substituting (2) to eliminate dθ, an
expression for the pro￿t process in terms of the shock and the number of
￿rms emerges as:
dπ = µ(m)πdm+ απdt + σπdW, with π0 ≡ u(m0)θ0 = π (3)
where µ(m) ≡ u0(m)/u(m) captures the direct eﬀect of entry. From (3), en-
try in￿uences the level of pro￿ts through its eﬀect on the market equilibrium
depending on the initial size of industry. In particular, given any value of
the shock θ, more ￿rms in the market implies a higher or lower equilibrium
level of pro￿ts depending on the presence of positive µ(m) > 0 or negative
µ(m) < 0 externalities respectively. The rest of this section is devoted to
summarising the main properties of the entry process driven by (3), em-
phasizing the economic intuition behind it; the rigorous analysis is given in
Section 4.
2.1 Negative externalities
Although the inverted U-shape of (1) implies an entry process that meets pos-
itive externalities ￿rst, we solve the investment problem by working backward
starting from the negative externalities interval.
If the initial size of the industry is m ≥ ﬂ m, we expect entry to work in
the following way: for a ￿xed number of ￿rms, pro￿ts move according to
the above stochastic process with µ(m)πdm =0 .I fp r o ￿ts then climb to a
level π∗ ≡ u(m)θ
∗, entry will become feasible and at the moment of entry,
pro￿ts will drop downward along the function u(m). In technical terms this
means that the threshold π∗ becomes an upper re￿ecting barrier on the pro￿t
process.6 Pro￿ts will then continue to move stochastically without the term
µ(m)πdm until another entry episode occurs.
Under this setting a (competitive) equilibrium can be de￿ned as a sym-
metric Nash equilibrium in entry strategies which bound the pro￿t process
of the ￿rms. Although, in general, it is diﬃcult to construct such an equilib-
rium, fortunately it can be built much more simply from the entry policy of
as i n g l e￿rm in isolation regardless of future entry decisions: ￿...., each ￿rm
can make its entry decision by ￿nding the expected present value of its pro￿ts
as if it were the last ￿rm that would enter this industry, a n dt h e nm a k i n gt h e
6The pro￿t function follows a regulated Brownian motion in the sense of Harrison
(1985).
7standard option value calculation. While the ￿rm should entertain rational
expectations about the stochastic process θ, it can be totally myopic in the
matter of other ￿rm￿s entry decisions￿ (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p.291).
This remarkable property of the competitive equilibrium, ￿rst discovered
by Leahy (1993), has an important operative implication: the optimal com-
petitive equilibrium policy need not take account of the eﬀect of entry. The
pro￿t level, say ￿ π, that triggers entry by the single ￿rm in isolation is iden-
tical to that of the ￿rm that correctly anticipates the other ￿rm￿s strategies
π∗. That is, when a ￿rm decides to enter claiming to be the last to enter
the industry, it is ignoring two things. First, it is thinking that its pro￿t
￿ow is given by u(m)θ with m hold ￿xed forever. Thus, as u0(m) < 0, it is
ignoring that future entry by other ￿rms, in response to higher value of θ,
will reduce its pro￿ts. Other things being equal, this would make entry more
attractive for the ￿rm that behaves myopically. Second, it ignores the fact
that the prospect of future entry by competitors reduces its option value of
waiting. That is, pretending to be the last to enter the industry, the ￿rm
also thinks that it still has a valuable option to wait before making an irre-
versible decision. Other things being equal, this makes the decision to enter
less attractive. The two eﬀects oﬀset each other, allowing the ￿rm to act as
if it were in isolation. This oﬀsetting behavior can be summarized by the
following result.
Result 1 The candidate policy for optimal entry in a competitive industry,
characterized by an initial mass of ￿rms m ∈ [ﬂ m,M), is described by





(ρ − α)K ≡ π




where ρ>αand β1 > 1 is the positive root of the auxiliary quadratic
equation Ψ(β)=1
2σ2β(β − 1) + αβ − ρ =0 .
Over the range [ﬂ m,M), new additional entry occurs every time the
pro￿ts climb to the known threshold π∗;i fp r o ￿ts stay below this barrier
no new investment is undertaken.
Proof. See Leahy (1993) and Section 4.
With m incumbents, an idle additional ￿rm will enter if the present value
of its pro￿ts at entry
u(m)θ∗(m)
ρ−α exceeds the cost of the investment K aug-
mented by the option of waiting to invest 1
β1−1K, i.e. by waiting a little the
8￿rm obtains a new observation of the market pro￿tability, reducing its down-
side risk.7 We can have a better intuition of the competitive equilibrium by
writing the above threshold in terms of the shock θ. Since π∗ ≡ u(m)θ
∗(m)
and u(m) is decreasing in the region [ﬂ m,M], the optimal policy can be re-








, for m ∈ [ﬂ m,M) (5)
In the region above the curve, it is optimal to enter. A discrete mass
of ￿rms will enter in a lump to move the pro￿ts level immediately to the
threshold curve. In the region below the curve the optimal policy is inaction:
￿rms wait until the stochastic process θ moves it vertically to θ
∗(m) and
then again a mass of ￿rms will jump into the market just enough to keep the
pro￿ts from crossing the threshold.
2.2 Positive externalities
Working backward towards the start-up of the industry, if the initial size m
is less than ﬂ m, any potential entrant is subject to positive externalities, that
is the value of entering the industry depends on the number of ￿rms who
have already entered. Therefore, the timing of a ￿rm￿s entry is in￿uenced
by the entry decisions of others and intuition suggests that Leahy￿s result
cannot be extended to cover this case: a single ￿rm cannot continue to claim
to be the last to enter the industry in constructing its optimal entry policy.
The gist of our argument relies on the presence of ￿network bene￿ts￿ so
the higher the number of ￿rms in the industry, the greater the advantage in
terms of pro￿t ￿ow. However, although investing is pro￿table, it is ￿more
expensive￿ to do it alone than to enter together with others or even later
on when others have already done so. This makes the Nash equilibrium
represented by the myopic trigger ￿ π no longer subgame-perfect. By the ￿rst-
mover disadvantage and the strategic nature of the timing decision, each ￿rm
can do better by delaying entry. Generally speaking, potentially con￿icting
preferences over appropriation of the positive ￿network bene￿ts￿ make them
face a choice between no entry and agreement.
7In other words, the decision to enter entails the exercise of an option to delay, when
the ￿rm enters its loss of ￿exibility is given by 1
β1−1K.
9However, as all ￿rms are subject to the same (industry-wide) uncertainty
shock, two equilibrium patterns are the only ones possible: either the industry
remains locked-in at the initial size, sustained by self-ful￿lling pessimistic
expectations8,o ram a s so f￿rms simultaneously runs to enter, driven by the
expected rents generated by the positive externalities. Excluding the former
for the sake of subgame-perfectness (see section 3 for a discussion of this case),
we are left with the latter. In this speci￿c case, we expect entry to work in
the following way: for a ￿xed number of ￿rms, pro￿ts move according to (3)
with µ(m)πdm =0 .I fp r o ￿ts climb to π∗∗ ≡ u(m)θ
∗∗, it will trigger an entry
of discrete size that raises the dimension of the industry instantaneously by
a jump. The exact form of the trigger π∗∗ as well as the size of the mass of
￿rms that jump into the industry upon reaching it is given in the following
result.
Result 2 The candidate policy for optimal entry in a competitive industry,
characterized by positive externalities and initial mass of ￿rms m ∈




∗(ﬂ m), for m ∈ [0, ﬂ m) (6)
Over the range [0, ﬂ m), the optimal entry policy is to set the threshold
π∗∗ equal to the known threshold u(ﬂ m)θ
∗(ﬂ m) where the pro￿t ￿ow is
maximum. No ￿rms enter if pro￿ts stay below this barrier, but a dis-
crete mass of (ﬂ m−m) new ￿rms ￿coordinate￿ entry the ￿rst time that
π∗∗ is reached.
Proof. See Section 4.
An immediate corollary that follows from Results 1 and 2 is:
Corollary 1 The pro￿t threshold that triggers the ￿network run￿ of (ﬂ m −
m) new ￿rms is the same re￿ecting barrier that triggers the marginal





(ρ − α)K ≡ π
∗∗(= π
∗).
8The ￿rms may delay entry till θ reaches, for the ￿rst time, the upper level θ
∗(m) which
indicates the ￿optimal￿ entry trigger for each idle ￿rm in isolation.
10Again, we can have a better intuition of the equilibrium by writing the
above threshold in terms of the aggregate shock θ. Since π∗∗ ≡ u(m)θ
∗∗(m)
and u(m) is increasing in the region [0, ﬂ m), the optimal policy is given by a
￿at curve starting at θ
∗∗(0) = θ









, for all m ∈ [0, ﬂ m) (7)
Figure 2 summarizes the eﬀect of positive externalities on entry. Thus
starting at m, if the initial shock is below the known trigger at ﬂ m,a l lt h e
￿rms wait until the θ rises vertically to this level, and then ￿coordinate￿
their entry to bring the size to the optimal level ﬂ m. Once the optimal size is
reached and to the right of ﬂ m, further decisions to enter proceed as explained
in the previous section with negative externalities. Intuitively, starting at any
m<ﬂ m, (6) (or (7)) locates the optimal entry threshold so as to maximize
the total pro￿ts of the incremental number of ￿rms that enter (ﬂ m − m).
The shock value θ
∗(ﬂ m) that triggers these ￿rms￿ ￿network run￿ is the same
threshold that justi￿es a further marginal entry under negative externalities.
Section 4 con￿r m st h a tt h i si si nf a c ta ne q u i l i b r i u m . N o￿rm would
ever invest at a lower entry trigger since this trigger is based on the most
optimistic assessment with respect to the other ￿rms, namely that they all
invest at θ
∗(ﬂ m). On the other hand no ￿rm ￿nds it convenient to delay its
entry given that the other ￿rms invest, since θ
∗(ﬂ m) is also the investment
trigger of the rivals.
Figure 2 about here
2.3 Dynamics of Industry Investments
By Results 1 and 2 and inverting (4), we are able to represent the properties of
the industry￿s dynamic entry pattern with positive and negative externalities.





determines the optimal industry size as a function of the state variable θ
and the vector of parameters (K,ρ,α,σ). For movements of the shock to
t h er i g h to ft h eb o u n d a r y ,n e w￿r m se n t e r ;i ft h es h o c ks t a y so nt h el e f to f
the boundary, no new investment is undertaken. Assuming as an example
11u(m)=m(40−m),ρ=0 .04,α=0 ,σ=0 .2 (at annual rate) and normalizing
K =1 0 ,000 ￿gure 3 below shows a possible entry pattern for this industry.
Figure 3 about here
The industry size process mt is singular: entry takes place only when
θ = θ
∗(m), except for the initial jump to ﬂ m =2 0(M =4 0 ) necessary to
bring θ into the region [θ









where T1 =i n f( t ≥ 0) | θ = θ
∗(20)) and J[θ=θ∗] denotes the indicator function





β1−1 =2 , it is evident that the ￿rms invest when market
pro￿tability is suﬃcient to guarantee that if they make their investment
decision simultaneously all the ￿network bene￿ts￿ will be captured and the
option value of waiting, indicated by 1
β1−1 =1 , will be recovered.
3 Coordination and Pareto-dominant equilib-
ria: a heuristic analysis
This section is devoted to highlighting where the above Nash equilibrium
in pure entry strategies comes from and its perfectness. The approach of
this section, however, is more on a heuristic level; the formal analysis with
pure strategies is performed in the next section. Moreover, although the
heuristic analysis uses mixed strategies, we show that the optimal policy is
outcome equivalent to that in which the ￿rms employ pure strategies. This
justi￿es formally proceeding in the next section as if each ￿rm uses pure
strategies. Finally, although we use discrete time rather than continuous
time, the reference paper for analysing the timing of investment is Fudenberg
and Tirole (1985).
Let￿s begin by assuming an industry of m ∈ [0, ﬂ m) incumbent ￿rms and a
suﬃciently high number of all equal outsider ￿rms looking to enter. To focus
on the basic question of the paper, we impose the following restrictions:
1. We start considering a one-shot-discrete-time game between a generic
ith ￿rm and a pool of (ﬂ m − m)−i <Mother ￿rms. Although, for
12convenience, we can refer to the (ﬂ m−m)−i ￿rms as the ￿other player￿,
we consider strategies and payoﬀs of each individual ￿rm;9
2. Since entry (investment) is irreversible the incumbents do not have
other decisions to make, while the outsiders choose a randomization
over {Enter, Don￿t Enter}. We can therefore simply use the term ￿rm
for the potential entrants.
3. The strategies (and payoﬀs) of all ￿rms in the investment game are
taken at ￿xed (stochastic) times: T1 for θ




∗(m), then almost surely T2 >T 1 > 0.W h e n θ hits θ
∗(ﬂ m)
for the ￿rst time, ￿rm i ￿s action set is {Enter, Don￿t Enter}. If ￿rm
i decides to invest at T1 its actions set becomes the null action ￿stay
in￿ forever. Conversely, if ￿rm i does not invest at T1 it must wait for
θ
∗(m) to be reached before entering, i.e. it waits until it is optimal to
enter as a single ￿rm in isolation.10
We shall relax some of these assumptions later.
3.1 Pure strategy equilibria
As stated, for the above one-shot-discrete-time game, each ￿rm has two
strategies available at T1: Entry (E) or go alone (No Entry, NE). Since
the de￿nition of T1 implies that simultaneous entry is not optimal before T1,
by convention we evaluate the payoﬀs by referring to time T1.T h e n T2 is
the ￿optimal￿ policy for each idle ￿rm in isolation and payoﬀsa r ee v a l u a t e d
accordingly. Finally, K is normalized to one.
Taking advantage of Fudenberg and Tirole￿s notation, we de￿ne the fol-
lowing four functions: the function M(T1) is the expected discounted value of
each ￿rm if all invest together at T1.T h ef u n c t i o nL(T1;T2) is the (leader￿s)
discounted value for the ￿rm that invests at T1 while all the rivals wait till
T2.F(T1;T2) is the (follower￿s) discounted value for the ￿rm that waits till
T2 before investing while the rivals go at T1. Finally, as at T2 it is always
9To avoid complication we do not consider the possibility of coalitions among the ¯ m
￿rms. See Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987) for coalition games and the related
de￿nition of coalition-proof Nash equilibria.




13optimal to enter, FF(T2) ≡ M(T2)=L(T2;T2)=F(T2;T2) is the payoﬀ
for joint-investment.
From the above de￿niton, if at time T1 all ﬂ m − m ￿rms simultaneously




















If none of them enter at T1,u n d e ro u r￿xed time assumption, all wait


















































It is always convenient to coordinate.
Although we stated that ￿rms have complete information, they have im-
perfect information, i.e. they choose their strategies without knowledge of
the other￿s choice. Therefore, in our ￿two-player￿ game, we should also eval-
uate the payoﬀ by a player who coordinates when the other fails to do so.
In particular, if at time T1 the ith ￿rm invests but the rest do not, its net
present value can be expressed as:
11As for m ≥ ¯ m the optimal competitive equilibrium policy need not consider strate-
gically simultaneous entry of other ￿rms (i.e. Result 1 holds), we simplify evaluating the



















































where T2 − ∆T =i n f ( t>T 1 | θ = θ
∗(m+i)) is the ￿r s tt i m et ow h i c ht h e
rivals respond by entering and m+i indicates that m (old) ￿r m sp l u st h e
(new) ith are now present in the market. On the contrary, if at time T1 the
(ﬂ m−m)−i ￿rms invest but the ith does not, the net present value of the ith







































That is, as θ
∗(m) is decreasing for m<ﬂ m, the ￿other player￿ who has
not coordinated responds ￿almost￿ immediately at T1 + ∆T =i n f ( t>0 |
θ = θ
∗(ﬂ m−i)).
By the properties of the above payoﬀs, we are able to conclude that the
following disequality holds:
Result 3 L(T1;T2) <FF(T2) <F(T1;T2) <M(T1)
Proof. See Appendix
The payoﬀs when a particular pair of strategies is chosen are given in the
appropriate cell of the bi-matrix below: the payoﬀ to the ith ￿rm is the one
at the top left of the cell.
15(ﬂ m − m)−i
i
E NE
E M,M L, . .
NE F,. .FF , FF
R e f e r r i n gt ot h ea b o v eb i - m a t r i x ,a se a c h￿rm within the ﬂ m−m can play
t h er o l eo fith and FF > L, the one-shot-discrete-time game presents only
two candidates for symmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies: ￿all E￿ and
￿all NE￿. Nevertheless, although ￿all E￿ is the Pareto-dominant equilibrium,
it is not clear that it is the one that will be played. In fact, as ￿rms are in￿n-
itesimally small, this makes F(T1;T2) ’ M(T1) and L(T1;T2) << FF(T2),
and the above game resembles a ￿one-sided coordination game￿ where one
agent strictly prefers to match the action played by the other, with player i
strictly preferring to match the ￿other player￿ if it plays NE. Putting some
numbers in the cells of the above bi-matrix, the game can be illustrated by
the following example:
(ﬂ m − m)−i
i
E NE
E 10 , 10 −5 ,. .
NE 9 ,. .4 , 4
While the Pareto outcome (10,10) may tend to make the strategy (E,E) a
focal point of the game, playing NE is much safer for player i, as it guarantees
4 regardless of how the other ￿players￿ play. In this situation we are not
certain what outcome to predict.12 The same uncertainty remains even if we
extend the game to include mixed strategies.
3.2 Mixed strategy equilibria
In this case we write:
12Without entering into the details of coalition-proof equilibria, if the ith ￿rm expects its
rivals to form a coalition, ￿all E￿ remains the only candidate for symmetric Nash equilibria
in pure strategies. To see that this is the case we have to complete the above bi-matrix
considering the payoﬀso f t h e(¯ m−m)−i ￿rms if, at time T1, the ith ￿rm coordinates but
they do not:
16￿ si(T1) as the probability ￿rm i enters (plays E) at time T1, if it has
not previously entered, with i ∈ (ﬂ m − m).
In pure strategies si(T1) equals zero or one, that is it maps each ￿rm￿s in-
formation set θ(T1) to one action: NE or E. In mixed strategies, si(T1) maps
each ￿rm￿s information set θ(T1) to a probability distribution over action.
Returning to the above one-shot-discrete-time game, if all the potential en-
trants are out of the market at time T1, ￿rm i￿s expected present discounted

































The value of the (¯ m − m)−i if they coordinate but the ith does not:













































Furthermore, L(T1;T2) <A (T1;T2) and B(T1;T2) <F(T1;T 2). Adding these payoﬀs,
the bi-matrix becomes:




NE F,BFF , FF
With FF(T1;T2) <A (T1;T2) (FF(T2) ’ A(T1;T2)) and B(T1;T2) >FF(T2). Strat-





























1)(M − F)+( 1− s−i(T
1))(L − FF)
⁄
where s−i(T1) ≡ s(ﬂ m−m)−i(T1), indicates the probability that all the (ﬂ m−m)−i
opponents play E. Following the usual procedure for solving a maximization
problem, we diﬀerentiate (12) with respect to the choice variable si(T1) to
obtain the ￿rst order condition:
s−i(T






[L(T1;T2) − FF(T2)] − [M(T1) − F(T1;T2)]
(13)
Since FF(T2) >L (T1;T2) and M(T1) >F(T1;T2), we get 0 ≤ ￿ s−i(T1) ≤










1)[(M − F) − (L − FF)]
£
s−i(T
1) − ￿ s−i(T
1)
⁄
If the opponents￿ probability of playing E is suﬃciently small, s−i(T1) <
￿ s−i(T1), ￿rm i￿s expected present discounted value is nonpositive, and ￿rm
i maximizes its payoﬀ by playing NE with certainty, i.e. si(T1)=0 . If the
opponents￿ probability of playing E is suﬃciently high, s−i(T1) > ￿ s−i(T1),
￿rm i￿s expected present discounted value is positive, and ￿rm i maximizes
its payoﬀ by coordinating entry with certainty, i.e. si(T1)=1 . Finally, if
s−i(T1)=￿ s−i(T1), ￿rm i￿s expected present discounted value is zero, and
independent of the probability of entering selected by i.
Which equilibrium strategies are more plausible depends on the number
of players. If each ￿rm plays E with an equal probability independent of the
others, this implies ￿ s−i(T1)=
Q
￿ si(T1)=￿ si(T1)ﬂ m−m−i. To exemplify, let￿s
assume an infant industry characterized by an initial mass of ￿rms m =0 ,
and ﬂ m =2 0 . It is easy to show that ￿ s−i(T1)=0 .9, which requires:
si(T
1) ≥ ￿ si(T
1)=0 .9
1/19 =0 .99447
18With a mass of ﬂ m−m potential entrants, ￿all E￿ is the optimal strategy
only if each individual ￿rm assesses the probability of E greater than 0.99447.
In other words, going alone at T2 ￿risk dominates￿ coordinate entry at T1
in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988).13 As the example suggests, when
there are more players, each player relies more on someone else coordinating.
The more ￿rms that have to decide entry, the less likely the coordination.
3.3 Subgame perfect equilibria
So far we have presented the entry process as a simultaneous game justi-
fying it by assuming a fairly unrealistic situation in which the ￿rms either
decided immediately (at T1) or the period they had to wait before being
able to reconsider (observe) the possibility of entering was so long that it
was as if they were choosing their strategies simultaneously. However, if the
interval between the diﬀerent decisions is shorter, even in continuous time,
the hypothesis of sequential decisions seems more realistic. In this case the
question is: can the Pareto superior coordinating outcome (E) be sustained
in a dynamic game? The answer is positive.
Before going on to the model in continuous time let￿s go further with the
discrete-time game, formally adding the probability that ￿rms enter between
T1 and T2.I f a t T2 no ￿rm has entered, as θ
∗(m) is the ￿optimal￿ policy
for each idle ￿rm in isolation, it will not be expedient for any ￿rm to wait
further. This implies that si(T2)=1for all i. Recalling that each ￿rm in the
mass ﬂ m − m can play the role of ith, proceeding inductively we can identify
at most three subgame perfect equilibrium strategies:14
(1) Firms play si(t)=1for t = T1, for all i ∈ (ﬂ m − m):the industry
shows coordinated entry;
(2) Firms play si(t)=0for t = T1 and si(t)=1for t = T2, for all
i ∈ (ﬂ m − m):the industry shows lock-in;
13A well-known example of a game with multiple equilibria is the one described in the
stag-hunt game; see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, ch.1) for a thorough discussion of games
with multiple equilibria and Pareto optimality.
14Only Markov perfect equilibria are examined. That is, the equilibrium concept applied
is that of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies for the exogenous variable
θ at which ￿rms decide to enter.
19(3) Firms play si(t)=￿ si(t) for t = T1 and si(t)=1for t = T2, for all
i ∈ (ﬂ m − m):the positive externalities result in equilibrium
strategies in which all ￿rms take a positive chance of making
a mistake in order to get the highest payoﬀ.
Which of the three is the strategy pro￿le that will be de￿nitely chosen
by the ￿r m si sg e n e r a l l yd i ﬃcult to assess, and working backward from the
last period does not help as it does not lead to uniqueness. However, if each
￿rm i behaves optimally along any enter probability path that includes the
mixed enter probabilities si(t)=￿ si(t) in T1, the above arguments suggest
that the third subgame perfect equilibrium strategy will be payoﬀ-equivalent
and outcome-equivalent to the ￿rst one of the pure strategy equilibria: ￿rms
enter at T1 and the mixed probabilities are never implemented. This reduces
the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies to only pure strategies.
Maintaining the heuristic spirit of this section we proceed in arguing why
the strategy pro￿le (1) is the most reasonable outcome of the game. We
do this checking that the strategy pro￿le (1) yields a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium as it is unimprovable in a single step, that is it never pays to
deviate from it in a single period while conforming to it thereafter.15 In
particular, we know that no strategy that calls for stay out at T2 can be
a Nash strategy, because the same strategy with entry replacing stay-out
dominates it. But if all the ￿r m sh a v es t r a t e g i e sc a l l i n gf o re n t r yi nt h el a s t
period, then a strategy calling for entry in the next-to-last period (i.e. at T1)
i sN a s hp e r f e c to n l yi fi ts h o w st h a ti ti sn o to p t i m a lt od e v i a t eb yr e p l a c i n g
entry with stay-out at T1. This should rule out any strategy that does not
call for ￿all E￿ everywhere along the equilibrium path.16
Take (1) as a candidate strategy solution and suppose the ith ￿rm deviates
in period T1 to return to the candidate solution at T2, i.e. it follows the
strategy pro￿le (2). In order to verify if the one-step deviation is optimal,
15Essentially this is the one-step-deviation principle. This principle is an application
of the fundamental dynamic programming principle of pointwise optimization, which says
that a pro￿le strategy is optimal if and only if it is optimal in each time period. For a proof
of the one-step-deviation principle see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p.109). Although this
principle applies, for both ￿nite and in￿nite horizon game, provided that events in the
distant future are made suﬃciently insigni￿cant through discounting, its use in the above
two-periods game can guide us as to how to come up with a candidate solution.
16It is also worth noting that the strategy ￿always E￿ is not a ￿dominant￿ strategy, as
it is in the one-shot game at T2, because it is not the best response to various suboptimal
strategies at T1.
20we evaluate, at time T1, the diﬀerence in the net present value between (1)
and (2) as:
s−i(T
1)M +( 1− s−i(T
1))L − FF ≥ 0.






1) < 1 (15)
By (15) if the opponents￿ probability of playing E is s−i(T1) > ￿ s−i(T1),
￿rm i￿s expected present discounted value is positive, and it maximizes its
payoﬀ by coordinating entry with certainty, si(T1)=1 . Simple application
o ft h ea b o v ee x a m p l es h o w st h a t￿ s−i(T1)=0 .6 much lower than ￿ s−i(T1)=
0.9. In other words, coordinating entry at T1 b e c o m e sl e s sr i s k y .
If we now allow the ￿rms to change their actions at any point in the
interval [T1,T2] (i.e. in the interval [θ
∗(ﬂ m),θ
∗(m)]), intuition suggests that
there are an in￿nite number of symmetric equilibrium strategies like the one
described above, characterized by its movement date t which calls for entry
at T1.
To understand how this can occur, there are two aspects of the entry game
in continuous time that must be considered. First of all, if after reaching
θ
∗(ﬂ m) ￿rms do not coordinate in the expectation that no-one will enter, they
may still do so at any successive ￿instant￿, say at t>T 1 with θt >θ
∗(ﬂ m), at
t h es a m ep r o ￿ts u(ﬂ m). B yt h eM a r k o vp r o p e r t yo ft h es t a t ev a r i a b l eθ, this
game has in￿nite subgame equilibria which are Pareto ranked by their date
of entry with earlier entry being more eﬃcient from the ￿rms￿ point of view.
In fact, de￿ning with L(t;T2),FF(T2−∆T) and M(t) the respective payoﬀs
evaluated at t>T 1,the probability that the ith ￿rm will play E decreases
as t increases without entry, and increases as the optimal entry time by the
single ￿rm T2 becomes more remote.17 That is:




17To simplify, we indicate the interval [T1,T2] as a synonym of the interval
[θ
∗(¯ m),θ
∗(m)] of the state variable θ.Obviously this is not always the case. In fact, al-
though the ￿rms can make their entry decisions within an apparently ￿nite time span
[T2 − T1], it is as if they can do so inde￿nitely. Owing to uncertainty, no ￿rm can per-
fectly predict θ at each date and since θ follows a random walk there is, for each time
interval dt, a constant probability of moving up or down. Formally this mean that we
must consider only the time interval for which θt >θ
∗(¯ m).H a v i n g s p e c i ￿ed this, we
continue to use the above synonym, con￿dent that it will not lead to confusion.
211)
∂￿ s−i(t)
∂t > 0 with limt→T2−∆T ￿ s−i(t)=1 ;
2)
∂￿ s−i(t)







In words, although for the ith ￿rm delaying the decision to enter means
an expected reduction in the bene￿ts of coordination with respect to go-
ing alone, i.e. M(t) − L(t;T2), there is also an equivalent reduction in the
costs associated with the delay itself expressed in terms of an increase in the
advantage of going alone with respect to waiting T2 and entering together,
i.e. FF(T2 − ∆T) − L(t;T2).T h et w oe ﬀects oﬀset each other so that the
opponents￿ probability threshold ￿ s−i(t) that makes ￿rm i￿s expected present
discounted value positive converges to one as t increases and, consequently,
the probability of ￿rm i entering if it has not previously entered si(t) tends
to zero.
The second part of the proposition says that the farther oﬀ the moment
when it will not be expedient for any ￿rm to wait any longer, the lesser
the advantage of going alone and the greater the advantage of coordinating;
￿ s−i(t) decreases while si(t) increases. The intuition of this result relies on the
de￿nition of T2. By (5), T2 →∞as m → 0:a smaller number of incumbents
implies more externalities in the market which increase the degree of coor-
dination among potential entrants. The greater the number of externalities
to be exploited, the lower the probability of mistakes and the coordination
problem becomes less severe.
The probability of mistakes is reduced also as uncertainty increases (the
third part of the proposition). The greater the uncertainty over future val-
ues of the shock θ, the larger the return the ￿rms will demand before they
will consider making the irreversible investment, which translates into an
increase of θ
∗(ﬂ m).However, a high level of θ
∗(ﬂ m) if delays the moment at
which it becomes advantageous to enter, in the same way it signals that
the pro￿tability of the market will be maintained even longer, which favours
coordination among potential entrants.
The second problem that must be considered is that in continuous time
games there is no notion of last time before t. The real line is not well
ordered and therefore induction cannot be applied. This denies the possibility
of building up an expected value such as (14), from which to deduce the
22optimal subgame perfect equilibrium strategies by working backward from
the end using (longer) subgames. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), and Simon
and Stinchcombe (1989), to which we refer for further details, highlight the
fact that there is a loss of information in the attempt to represent continuous-
time equilibria as the limits of discrete time mixed strategy equilibria. They
argue that in these kind of games a strategy cannot be represented by a single
distribution function. To correct for this loss of information they extend the
strategy space to specify not only the cumulative distribution that player i
has entered by time t given that the others have not yet entered, but also the
intensity of atoms on the interval between [t,t + dt].18 With this formalism
these authors see continuous time as discrete-time with a length of reaction
(or information lag) that becomes in￿nitely negligible to allow the ￿rms to
respond immediately to the rivals￿ actions. A class of continuous strategies is
then de￿ned so that any increasingly narrow sequence of discrete-time grids
generates a convergent sequence of game outcomes whose limit is independent
of the grid sequence. In the limit when the period length converges at zero,
an entry will occur immediately regardless of the value assumed by the per-
period probability. However, the probability of having simultaneous entry
varies with this probability. In this speci￿c case, the Pareto superior joint
moving outcome of the above ￿one-sided coordination game￿, all moving at
T1, seems to be the most reasonable outcome of the game. Furthermore,
Simon and Stinchcombe (1989, p. 1198-1200) show that the Pareto superior
joint moving equilibrium is the unique equilibrium that survives iterated
elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
18In this speci￿c case, it is worth noting how the per-period probability (15) coincides
with the notion of ￿intensity of entry￿ introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). The
function value ˜ s−i(t) should be interpreted as the probability that the (¯ m−m)−i opponents
play E in the matrix game below:
(¯ m − m)−i
i
˜ s−i(t) 1 − ˜ s−i(t)
˜ si(t) M(t) ,M (t) L(t;T2) ,. .
1 − ˜ si(t) F(t;T2) ,. . repeat the game
234 A formal analysis
This section is devoted to the proof of Results 1 and 2. The aim is to
demonstrate that the candidate policies presented in (4) and (6) are indeed
optimal. As the simultaneous investment scenario by letting the ￿rms play
mixed strategies is outcome equivalent to the one in which the ￿rms employ
pure strategies, we conduct the analysis as if each ￿r mu s e sas t o p p i n gr u l e
(a pure Markovian strategy) that speci￿es the critical value of the shock θ
beyond which the ￿rms invest.19 We refer to some dynamic optimization
solutions extensively studied in the Operations Research literature where an
It￿ process is constrained never to leave an (optimal) region (see Harrison and
Taksar, 1983, Karatzas and Shreve 1984, 1985; Harrison, 1985), and to some
well-known applications to the case of a competitive economy (see Leahy,
1993; Bartolini, 1993; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The results presented by
these authors can be applied with some modi￿cations to the problem at hand.
In particular, the special structure of the industry considered here leads to
some important new insights into the analysis.
For the optimal entry policy, the ￿rst thing to do is to ￿nd the value
of an established ￿rm V (m,θ) as the expected discounted stream of pro￿ts
π(m,θ) ≡ u(m)θ, given each ￿rm￿s optimal future entry policy:









J[t=τi]K | m0 = m, θ0 = θ
#
(16)
where J[t=τ] is the indicator function that assumes the values one or zero
depending on whether the argument is true or false, and the expectation is
taken considering that the number of active ￿rms may change over time by
new entry. A solution of (16) can be obtained starting within a time interval
where no new entry occurs. Over this interval the number of ￿rms is ￿xed
and the ￿rm is an asset which pays a ￿ow of pro￿ts u(m)θ per unit of time,
and experiences a ￿capital￿ gain as θ evolves stochastically. The pro￿ts and
the expected ￿capital￿ gain must add up to the risk-adjusted return ρ if the
19Since Markovian strategies incorporate all the information relevant for the game, if
a player uses a Markovian strategy, then the best response that his rivals can adopt is
Markovian as well. This means that a Markovian equilibrium remains such even if the
players are allowed to use history-dependent strategies (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.
501).
24￿rm wishes to stay active (Bellman equation):
ρV (m,θ)dt = u(m)θdt+ E[dV (m,θ)] (17)
Assuming V (m,θ) to be a twice-diﬀerentiable function with respect to θ
and using It￿￿s Lemma to expand dV (m,θ), the no-arbitrage condition (17)





2Vθ(m,θ) − ρV (m,θ)+u(m)θ =0 (18)
As long as the number of active ￿rms m is ￿xed, (18) is an ordinary
diﬀerential equation familiar in the option pricing methodology (Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994, p.179-180). Provided that ρ>αin order for the value of the




where 1 <β 1 <ρ / α ,β 2 < 0 are, respectively, the positive and the negative
root of the characteristic equation Ψ(β)=1
2σ2β(β − 1) + αβ − ρ =0 , and
A, B a r et w oc o n s t a n t st ob ed e t e r m i n e d .
To keep V (m,θ) ￿nite as θ becomes small, i.e. lim
θ→0
V (m,θ)=0 , we discard
the term in the negative power of θ setting B =0 . Moreover, the boundary
conditions also require that limθ→∞ {V (m,θ) − v(m,θ)} =0 , where the sec-
ond term in the limit represents the discounted present value of the pro￿t

















Since the last term represents the value of the active ￿rm in the absence
of new entry, then A(m)θ
β1 is the correction of the ￿rm￿s value due to the
new entry and A(m) must therefore be negative.
To determine this coeﬃcient for each m we need to impose some suitable
boundary conditions. First of all, perfect competition (free entry) requires
25the idle ￿rms to expect zero pro￿ts at entry. Then, indicating by θ
∗(m) the
value of the shock θ at which the mth ￿rm is indiﬀerent between entry right









The ￿rm￿s competitive behavior keeps the value of active ￿rms below the
level K, by increasing the number of ￿rms in the market. Moreover, as we
assumed that the ￿rm￿s size is in￿nitesimal, then the trigger level θ
∗(m) is
also a continuous function in m.
Secondly, it is worth noting that the number of ￿rms m aﬀects V (m,θ)
depending on the sign of θ
∗(m).S i n c et h et e r mθ
β1 in (21) is always positive,
any change in m either raises or lowers the whole function V (m,θ), depending
on whether the coeﬃcient A(m) increases or decreases. This simpli￿es the
optimization of θ





























Furthermore, since each ￿rm rationally forecasts the future development
of all the market and new entries by competitors, at the optimal entry thresh-




ρ−α =0(Bartolini, 1993; propo-


















In conjunction with the matching value condition (21), the above ex-
tended smooth pasting condition says that either each ￿rm exercises its entry
option at the level of θ at which its value is tangent to the entry cost, i.e.
Vθ(m,θ
∗(m)) = 0,o rt h eo p t i m a lt r i g g e rθ
∗(m) does not change with m.
20Note that this is a generalization of the condition in Dixit (1993, p. 35). If the ￿rm
claims to be unique or the last to enter the market, then u0(m)=A0(m)=0and the ￿rst
order (22) reduces to Vθ(m,θ
∗(m)) = 0.
26While the former case means that the value function is smooth at entry and
the trigger is a continuous function of m, t h el a t t e rc a s es a y st h a ti ft h i s
condition is not satis￿ed, a single ￿rm would bene￿t from marginally an-
ticipating or delaying its entry decision. In particular if Vθ(m,θ
∗(m)) < 0
it means that the value of a ￿rm is expected to increase if θ drops (invest-
ing now will be expected to lead to almost sure pro￿ts); on the contrary if
Vθ(m,θ
∗(m)) > 0 it means that an active ￿rm would expect to make losses
versus a future drop in θ. In both situations (22) is satis￿ed by imposing
dθ∗(m)
dm =0 , and therefore the same level of shock may either trigger entry by
a positive mass of ￿r m so rl o c k - i nt h ei n d u s t r ya tt h ei n i t i a ll e v e lo f￿rms.21
The rest of the proof is devoted to showing that for the m ≥ ﬂ m the smooth
pasting condition reduces to the traditional one, where Vθ(m,θ
∗(m)) = 0 and
θ
∗(m) is increasing in m. For m<ﬂ m, we get Vθ(m,θ
∗(m)) > 0 which requires
dθ∗(m)
dm =0 .
4.1 Optimal trigger value with negative externalities
I nt h ec a s eo fm ≥ ﬂ m we show two things: (1) the smooth pasting condition
(22) reduces to Vθ(m,θ
∗(m)) = 0; (2) the optimal competitive trigger θ
∗(m)
is equivalent to the trigger of a ￿rm in isolation, that is of a ￿rm claiming to
be the last to enter the industry.
For (1), let￿s consider the value of an active ￿rm starting at the point
(m,θ < θ
∗), that would follow the optimal policy hereafter. Indicating by
T the ￿r s tt i m et h a tθ reaches the trigger θ
∗, the optimal policy must then
satisfy:
































∗(m)) | m0 = m, θ0 = θ
‚
where V (m,θ
∗(m)) represents the optimal continuation value of the ￿rm.
Since, by (21), the present value of pro￿ts at T is K, the above value can be
21If this condition does not hold, the expected ￿capital￿ gain or loss at θ
∗(m) would be
in￿nite due to the in￿nite variation property of the stochastic process θ.
27written as:







−ρtθtdt | θ0 = θ]+KE0[e
−ρT | θ0 = θ]
‚
(24)
Moreover, the expected value that appears in the above expression can be
found by using some standard results in the theory of the regulated stochastic


















Substituting these expressions in (24) and rearranging, we get:


















Now, to choose optimally θ




























Since u(m) is decreasing in the interval [ﬂ m,M),θ
∗(m) is increasing. More-























22For these results see Karlin and Taylor (1974, ch.7); Harrison and Taksar (1983);
Harrison (1985, ch.3), and for a non-technical review, Dixit and Pindyck (1994, 315-316)
and Moretto (1995).
28f r o mw h i c hi ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tVm(m,θ) 6=0within the interval θ<θ
∗(m)
and zero at the boundary.
For (2), let￿s consider an idle ￿rm pretending to be the last to enter the
industry. With m ￿rms already active, if the ￿rm decides to enter when the
shock is θ, it pays K and receives in return an asset that values v(m,θ) as in






−ρT[v(m,￿ θ) − K] | m0 = m, θ0 = θ
o
(31)
where T indicates the ￿r s tt i m et h a tθ hits the trigger ￿ θ. Substituting (19)





















Taking the derivative of the above expression with respect to ￿ θ and solv-
ing it, it is easy to show that the optimal threshold is equivalent to (28).
Although at ￿r s tg l a n c et h i sr e s u l ts e e m ss u r p r i s i n g ,i ti sn o t .I ti sc o n s i s t e n t
with the properties of the dynamic programming principle of optimality for
a symmetric Nash equilibrium in entry strategies. The optimality principle
says that an optimal path has the property that given the initial conditions
and control values over an initial period, the control over the remaining pe-
riod must be optimal for the remaining problem, with the state resulting
from the early decisions considered in the initial condition. This principle
matches with the de￿nition of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where a
strategy pro￿le is a Nash equilibrium if no ￿rm has the incentive to deviate
from its strategy given that the other ￿r m sd on o td e v i a t e( F u d e n b e r ga n d
Tirole, 1991, p. 108).
Therefore, for the problem at hand, a perfect Nash equilibrium means
that if all ￿rms follow a policy of entry, no individual ￿rm can ￿nd it optimal
to follow any other policy. Formally this implies ￿nding a trigger level θ
∗
such that a single ￿rm ￿nds it optimal to enter with the others. Suppose
that all ￿rms have decided to enter at θ
∗, with θ
∗ > ￿ θ. This cannot be a
Nash equilibrium since a single ￿rm can do better by entering at ￿ θ.I nf a c t ,
29s i n c eb y( 3 )t h em y o p i cp r o ￿t process and the competitive pro￿t process are
identical until θ
∗, the pro￿t ￿ow that the ￿rm is able to obtain following the
policy ￿ θ i st h eb e s tt h a ti tc a nd o ,a tl e a s tt i l lT.However, by the principle of
o p t i m a l i t yt h i sc h o i c ei sa l s oo p t i m a lf o rt h er e s to ft h ep e r i o da s( 2 3 )s h o w s :
if the optimal policy of the single ￿rm calls for it to be active at θ
∗ tomorrow,
it is obvious that the optimal policy today is to enter at ￿ θ. Finally, as (23)
is a continuous function in θ
∗, the limit as θ
∗ → ￿ θ shows that ￿ θ is a Nash
equilibrium (Leahy, 1993; proposition 1).
Another way of considering the same result is to compare (26) with (32).
The value of a competitive ￿rm (26) that is active in the market is the
diﬀerence between the value of an active myopic ￿rm and the value of an
inactive myopic ￿rm as expressed by (32). Competition, therefore, not only
does not alter the incentive to trade an idle ￿rm for an active ￿rm but also
encourages both to have the same price at entry. Using (28) in equation (30)
gives V (m,θ
∗(m)) − K =0 , i.e. in equilibrium ￿rms expect zero pro￿ta t
entry (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, ch.8).
4.2 Optimal trigger value with positive externalities
In the case of m<ﬂ m we have to show three things: (1) that a single ￿rm
can no longer claim to be the last to enter the industry and, therefore, the
optimal competitive trigger is no longer equivalent to the trigger of a ￿rm
in isolation; (2) that the candidate policy described in Result 2 satis￿es the
necessary and suﬃcient conditions of optimality; (3) that it is a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
For (1) and (2), let￿s consider an (idle) ￿rm that follows the optimal policy
θ
∗(m).A sθ
∗(m) is decreasing in the interval m<ﬂ m, the higher the number
of ￿rms in the industry, the greater the pro￿t ￿ow at entry. The (idle) ￿rm
would then maximize its entry option by claiming to be always the last to
enter the market expecting an inadmissible upward jump in pro￿ts. To see
this more formally, consider a ￿rm that claims to have been the last to enter
at θ = θ












In (33) the inequality holds since it represents the correction due to the
30new entry (i.e. A(m)θ
β1 in (20)). This contradicts the smooth pasting con-
dition Vθ(m,θ
∗(m)) = 0 and then the optimality of θ
∗(m).
As all (idle) ￿r m sa r ee q u a l ,a l le x p e c ta nu p w a r dj u m pi np r o ￿ts at
θ = θ
∗(m) if no other ￿rm enters afterwards. This may induce each of them
to delay entry waiting for the others to enter ￿rst. However, as θ
∗(m) is
decreasing in the interval m<ﬂ m, the upward jump in pro￿ts would decrease
as more ￿rms have already entered and it disappears at m =ﬂ m where the
￿rm￿s value function at entry is just the known function (30). This con￿rms
that: a) the candidate policy for the interval m<ﬂ m is to impose
dθ∗(m)
dm =0 ;
b) the optimal level of shock that triggers entry is θ
∗(ﬂ m) where the pro￿t
￿ow is maximum for all the discrete sizes of investment (ﬂ m−m);c )a tﬂ m the
necessary condition for optimality Vθ(ﬂ m,θ
∗(ﬂ m)) = 0 turns out to be satis￿ed
again.
To verify that the necessary conditions are satis￿ed, let￿s calculate the
value of an active ￿rm starting at the point (m,θ), that would follow a
policy de￿ned by two parameters: wait until the ￿rst instant T at which the
process θ rises to a level c>θ ,corresponding to an immediate increase of
the industry size to b>m .Making use of (23) the expected payoﬀ V (m,θ)






























If the ￿rm were able to choose the best moment for the industry size￿s






























31When b and c are chosen according to the candidate policy so that b =ﬂ m
and c = θ
∗(ﬂ m) the value function reduces to (20) and the matching value
condition requires V (b,c)=K. These properties verify that the candidate
policy satis￿es the above ￿rst order conditions.
By processing (33) we can say more about the necessary conditions. Let
the ￿rm, as in (34), wait until the ￿rst time the process θ rises to the myopic
trigger level c ≡ θ
∗(b), corresponding to an immediate increase of the industry
size to b>m ,and assume also that the ￿rm expects no more entry after
b. Therefore its expected payoﬀ V (b,θ) from this time onwards equals the





Comparing (35) with (20) gives A(b)=0 . Therefore to obtain the constant
A(m), subject to the claim that beyond b no other ￿rm will enter the market,
we substitute (20) into the condition Vm(m,θ



































Substituting (37) into (20), which we rewrite to make explicit its depen-













As long as u(b) >u (m) the ￿r s tt e r mi n( 3 8 )i sp o s i t i v ea n di tf o r e c a s t s
the advantage the ￿rm would experience by the entry of b − m ￿rms when
32θ hits θ
∗(b). That is, if the ￿rm were able to choose the optimal dimension
of the jump, it would be b → ﬂ m which happens the ￿r s tt i m et h a tθ reaches
θ
∗(ﬂ m). Thus, as opposed to before non-sequential investments are possibile,
the necessary conditions would coordinate an optimal simultaneous entry by
all the ￿rms, i.e. θ
∗(ﬂ m) is a (symmetric) Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium
for all m<ﬂ m. Finally, if u00(m) < 0 the necessary conditions are also
suﬃcients.
As the stochastic process θ is common knowledge, each ￿rm can foresee
the bene￿t from the entry of others and observing the realization of the
state variable θ instantaneously considers when to enter by maximizing (38).
In addition, as the reaction lags are literally nonexistent, no ￿rm has the
incentive to deviate from the entry strategy θ → θ
∗(ﬂ m) and b → ﬂ m given
that the other ￿rms do not deviate. Finally, since θ is a Markov process in
levels (Harrison, 1985, p.5-6), the conditional expectation (34) is in fact a
function solely of the starting states so that, at each date t>0, the ￿rm￿s
values resemble those described in (38) which makes the equilibrium subgame
perfect.
5 Positive externalities and the case of telecom-
munication services
So far we consider the function u(m) as a reduced form of a more general
pro￿t function or, in a simpler setting without operating costs, as the inverse
demand function of a network good. This section is devoted to developing
this application a bit further and to analysing the implications of the above
optimal entry policy for a network product. In this regard, we consider the
￿rms￿ decision to set up a network for satisfying a demand for telecommuni-
cation services.
5.1 Interconnection and competitive provider
Following the pioneering approach of Rohlfs (1974)23, we consider a group of a
M continuum of potential telecommunication customers uniformly indexed
by i ∈ [0,M] and ranked in decreasing order of willingness to pay. We
interpret customers indexed by low i as those who place high valuation on
23See also Shy (2001) ch.5.







M)q − u if s/he subscribes
0 if s/he does not subscribe
(39)
where q is the total number of consumers who actually subscribe and u is
the connection fee.24 To derive the consumers￿ aggregate demand for phone
services we look at the consumer m who is, for a given price u,i n d i ﬀerent to
subscribing or not subscribing the service. By (39) the indiﬀerent consumer
is found by (1 − m
M)q − u =0and assuming ful￿lled-expectations about the
number of subscribers, we get q = m. Substituting we obtain the inverse





The inverse aggregate demand function (40) exhibits a path similar to
the one in ￿gure 1. It is upward sloping at small demand levels (i.e. over
the interval [0, ﬂ m)) and becomes downward sloping at high demand levels.
In particular u(0) = 0,u (M)=0and ﬂ m = M
2 . For any given m, u(m) is
therefore the reservation price of the marginal subscriber.
On the supply side, we assume that there are many idle ￿rms ready to
provide telecommunication services with the following characteristics:
￿ Each ￿rm can serve one single customer with a ￿xed coeﬃcient tech-
nology, i.e. each ￿rm provides one unit of service per period.25 Then m
indicates the total number of consumers that subscribe as well as the
size of the industry providing the phone system.
￿ Each ￿rm can enter by building its own network at cost K, but this cost
is sunk and the investment is irreversible (K is the cost of connecting
the house of a new customer to the total network).
24Congestion can be easily adpated to this model introducing an utility function of type
Ui =( 1− i
M)f(q) − u, where the network eﬀect is given by the function f(q) with the
properties that f(0) = 0,f 00(q) < 0 and there exist a maximum at some positive level of
subscribers (see Lee and Mason, 2001).
25It is worth noting that the quality of our results would not change if we assume that
each ￿rm serves a single network with an equal number of costumers.
34￿ Interconnection is provided. That is, each ￿rm may use the infrastruc-
ture owned by other ￿rms in the industry paying a ￿xed access price
per unit of time which is the same for all ￿rms. Then m also indicates
the total dimension of the network.26
With m>0 incumbent ￿rms currently active, if the interconnection fees
are the only operative cost borne by the potential entrants, in view of (40),
each provider will expect to yield a ￿ow of operating pro￿ts equal to:




where θ is a stochastic variable that summarises diﬀerent kinds of randomness
from variable inputs to shifts of technology.
5.2 Equilibrium network size
Going on with the case of demand for telecommunication services m stands
for the number of users that subscribe before the network grows and gen-
erates bandwagon bene￿ts, while ﬂ m = M
2 indicates the minimal demand-
based equilibrium network achieved by rolling over the upward-sloping part
of the inverse demand curve (40) by positive feedback. This positive feedback
process starts as θ reaches an upper level.
Proposition 2 The minimal demand-based size of the network M
2 is reached
by the connection of M






















In other words, M
2 is the minimal number of customers needed to ensure
that at least they will bene￿t from subscribing to the service at the fee u = M
4 .
26As the ￿rms are in￿nitesimal and indistinguishable (as well as the customers) it seems
reasonable to assume an equal access price. This is equivalent to assuming free access
among ￿rms.
35The timing to build up this minimal network depends on the evolution of
the exogenous shock θ.I nt h er e g i o nb e l o wθ
∗ the optimal policy is inaction,
the ￿r s tt i m et h a tθ hits the level
β1
β1−1(ρ−α)4K
M am a s so fM
2 −m outsiders
coordinate their entry subscribing. Once the network has reached its minimal
size, on the right of M
2 further entries proceed as market demand increases.
Finally, while the mass of new subscribers strongly depend on the initial
user set m, the critical threshold does not. However, the degree of coordi-
nation among potential entrants increases as m decreases as there are more
externalities to be exploited (see proposition 1).
6 Comments on the literature
The previous section has shown that for m<ﬂ m the candidate policy θ
∗(ﬂ m)
is the unique threshold beyond which a mass (ﬂ m − m) of idle ￿rms ￿nds
it optimal to move simultaneously. This was done by showing that θ
∗(ﬂ m)
satis￿es the necessary and suﬃcient conditions of optimality for a single ￿rm
that ￿nds it optimal to enter with the others. It is also shown that once
entry has exhausted the positive externalities, new ￿rms will enter following
the standard competitive rule (5) where in equilibrium the option value of
waiting does drop to zero. In this respect, our model is an extension of the
dynamic equilibrium in a competitive industry presented by Leahy (1993)
and Dixit and Pindyck (1994, ch.5).27 Contrary to that model we allow the
￿rms to experiment positive externalities before the industry reaches the size
where negative externalities apply. We ￿nd that ￿r m si n v e s ts i m u l t a n e o u s l y
once the industry pro￿tability has developed suﬃciently to allow them to
capture all the externalities and to recover the option value of waiting. In
a duopoly model, Nielsen (2002) predicts a result similar to ours, namely
that the ￿rms invest simultaneously at the market pro￿tability given by the
duopoly pro￿t.28 Thus Nielsen￿s result (2002) holds more generally in a free
entry competitive framework.
27Baldursson (1998) extends Dixit and Pindyck￿s model considering Cournot-Nash com-
petition. His analysis indicates that although qualitatively the investment process is sim-
ilar in oligopoly and competitive equilibrium, oligopoly quantitatively slows down invest-
ment.
28Huisman (2001, ch. 8) extends the Nielsen (1999) model introducing asymmetry
into the investment costs of the ￿rms. Although cost asymmetry may reduce the positive
externality eﬀect, both ￿rms invest simultaneously and early in anticipation that the other
will invest early as well.
36Obviously simultaneous investments may arise under circumstances very
diﬀerent from those considered here. For example in Bartolini (1993), simul-
taneous investment is driven by a constraint on the total size of the industry.
He considers a competitive industry where the ￿rms initially enter follow-
ing the optimal policy as in Result 1, until a ￿critical￿ size is reached. At
this ￿critical￿ size, rent competition generates a ￿competitive run￿ that im-
mediately ￿lls the rest of the quota. During this run the ￿rms experience
a reduction of current pro￿ts in the attempt to capture the rent that the
constraint on the industry size is expected to generate. Unlike Bartolini,
in our model a run is generated by the maximization of the rent associated
with the positive externalities. These rents will be dissipated in the future
by competitive entry of ￿rms with negative externalities. Moreover, as entry
is not constrained, the negative externalities do not lead to pro￿tr e d u c t i o n
during the run. To see this formally, let￿s start by imposing the free entry
zero-pro￿ts condition at ﬂ m. That is:
V (ﬂ m,θ






− K =0 (42)
Unlike Bartolini (1993), at the end of the run equation (42) implies
A(ﬂ m) < 0, which gives (28) as optimal entry policy.29 Secondly, substituting


















The term inside square brackets is always positive (i.e. there is no value
m0 ∈ (m, ﬂ m) that makes it nil), and (43) holds with dθ∗
dm =0 .T h a t i s , a l l
￿rms in the range (m, ﬂ m) must enter at θ = θ
∗(ﬂ m).
In Grenadier (1996) on the other hand, simultaneous investment occurs
because two ￿rms rush to enter a declining real estate market that will oth-
erwise leave space only for one ￿rm. As developers see the market falling
they realise that if they continue to wait and none of them decide to invest,
they will be shut out of the market. Grenadier refers to this occurrence as a
￿recession-induced construction boom￿, however it occurs only if the initial
29If M =¯ m is the constraint on the total size of the industry then A(¯ m)=0and eq.
(11) in Bartolini (1993) gives u(¯ m)θ
∗(¯ m)=( ρ −α)K<π ∗. However, as by assumption 6
M could be arbitrarily large this excludes ￿competitve run￿ in our model.
37level of demand is greater than the level that induces to optimally invest as
af o l l o w e r .
In Moretto (2000), simultaneity arises because of a bandwagon eﬀect on
entry costs. Two ￿r m sa r ee n g a g e di na n￿ a t t r ition￿ game generated by
the presence of incomplete information plus positive externalities (￿network
bene￿ts￿) on the investment costs: i.e. it is more expensive to go ￿rst than to
adopt the technology coordinately or later on when others have already done
so. Although the ￿rst-mover disadvantage leads to sequential investment,
if the asymmetry between ￿rms is not too high the investment occurs as a
cascade: i.e. the bene￿ts of going second after the ￿rst ￿rm has invested
induces the second to follow suit.30 At the opposite end, Huisman and Kort
(1999) show that simultaneous investments may arise also in the presence
of negative externalities. The model considers a preemption game where
two identical ￿rms are active on a market and have the option to make an
irreversible investment in a new technology which results in higher pro￿t
￿ow. Although, in general, the presence of a ￿rst-mover advantage leads
to a preemption equilibrium where one ￿rm plays the role of leader, the
condition of both the ￿rms being already active on the output market where
they compete does not exclude the possibility of both ￿rms investing at the
same time. This happens in particular when the ￿rst-mover advantage is so
low that both the ￿rms prefer to delay investment and invest at a later time
jointly. Maison and Weeds (2001) show the same result in a similar duopoly
model. Although they consider the simultaneous presence of negative and
positive externalities, the only case in which both ￿rms enter simultaneously
is when they know that if the investment occurred sequentially, the leader
would lose out considerably once the follower decided to enter.
Finally, all these recent works are built upon the seminal paper of Farrell
and Saloner (1986). These authors present a two-agent model of technology
investment with uncertainty about the timing of the investment, positive
externalities and irreversibility where each agent has to invest exogenously
at random opportunities driven by a Poisson process. They count cases of
preemption equilibrium as well as cases of joint adoption. However, if agents
are allowed to invest at any time and not just at occasional chances, many of
the features found by Farrell and Saloner would disappear leaving the basic
30Dosi and Moretto (1996, 1998) also examine a war of attrition game induced by
spillover bene￿ts on the cost of adopting a ￿green￿ technology. They show that auction-
ing green investment grants is a better policy to stimulate simultaneous investment than
standard subsidies that lower investment costs.
38coordination problem due to the positive externalities.
7C o n c l u s i o n
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v eo ﬀered an initial investigation into the eﬀect of compe-
tition on the irreversible investment decisions under uncertainty of the ￿rms
as generalization of the ￿real option￿ approach. We have considered a prod-
uct market that allows simultaneous treatment of two diﬀerent cases, namely
those of positive externalities for low level of market size and negative ex-
ternalities for high level of market size. The latter case corresponds to the
traditional competitive industries in which the investment of one ￿rm lowers
the pro￿tability of the others. In this case, ￿rms invest sequentially as the
market pro￿tability develops.
The former case corresponds to industries in which investments are mutu-
ally bene￿cial: the investment of one ￿rm increases the pro￿tability of other
￿rms￿ investments. In this case we ￿nd that ￿rms invest simultaneously af-
ter the pro￿tability of the market has developed suﬃciently. By suﬃcient
we mean the pro￿t level that triggers a ￿rst investment under negative ex-
ternalities; this trigger determines endogenously the optimal start-up size of
the industry. Not excluding further improvements, putting together these
theoretical results may help to explain both the recent rapid and sudden de-
velopment that has occurred for internet investments, for example the setting
up of dotcoms on the World Wide Web for e-commerce, and the many pro-
longed start-up problems while awaiting market development as, for example,
the story of the digital fax machines shows (Rohlfs, 2001).31
Some extensions can be easily incorporated such as the inclusion of ￿nitely-
lived capital projects, stage investments, growth options and operative op-
tions that lead to suspension or de￿nitive abandonment of the investments.
The model also permits study of the eﬃciency of the investment-entry pat-
tern. Is the equilibrium investment-entry time eﬃcient? Does the eﬃcient
entry pattern occur in equilibrium? This study can be conducted consider-
ing the cooperative solution where the investment decisions are determined
by maximizing the sum of the ￿rms￿ value functions or introducing a true
31Both these are examples of interlinked network services competitively supplied. Each
consumer enjoys network externalities not only with respect to the consumers of his or
her own supplier. The history of the fax also illustrates the importance of interlinking in
making the demand grow to solve the start-up problem.
39social value function. Finally a more substantial modi￿cation concerns the
comparison with the case in which there is a monopolist which possesses all
the investment opportunities. Although intuitively the start-up problem in
this case is much simpler, of particular interest is the analysis of the start-
up conditions and the optimal network size. In the speci￿c, where network
externalities are present, it may be pro￿table for the monopolist to sacri￿ce
pro￿t si nt h es h o r t - r u ni nt h eh o p eo fr a i s i n gp r i c e si nt h ef u t u r ea f t e rt h e
demand has grown and consumers are enjoying network eﬀects.
40A Appendix
A.1 Properties of FF(T2),F(T1;T2),M(T1) and L(T1;T2).
Lemma 1 M(T1) >FF(T2)



















, for m ∈ [0, ﬂ m) (44)
with M(T1) ≡ ff(ﬂ m). Now, making use of the variable x(m)=
u(m)
u(ﬂ m) which is
monotonically increasing in m, with x =1for m =ﬂ m and x =0for m =0 ,






β1−1 , for x ∈ [0,1)
with ff(1) = 1
β1−1,f f (0) = 0. Now, taking the derivative of ff(x) with
respect to x gives ff0(x)=−β1 (x)
β1−1 + β1 (x)
β1−2 = β1 (x)
β1−1 (x−1 − 1),
which is always positive for x<1 (i.e. for m<ﬂ m).
Lemma 2 FF(T2) <F(T1;T2) <M(T1)
Proof. As FF(T2) ≡ ff(ﬂ m−i), this follows directly from application of
the properties of ff(m).
Lemma 3 L(T1;T2) <FF(T2).





β1−1x − 1 and x(m)=
u(m)




β1−1] > 0 for all x, yields l(x) ≤ ff(x) for all x ∈ [0,1).
Therefore, simple considerations show that L(T1;T2) ≡ l(m+i) <f f (m+i),
where the last inequality follows from the in￿nitesimal dimension of the ith
￿rm (see ￿gure 4 below).










Figure 4: ff(x) and l(x) with β1 =2 .
A.2 Monotonicity property of M,F and L
Let￿s consider the case in which the ￿rms coordinate at t>T 1 with θt >
θ
∗(ﬂ m).B yt h es h a p eo fθ
∗(m), it is always possible to ￿nd ￿ m<ﬂ m such that
θt = θ
∗(￿ m) >θ
∗(ﬂ m). Then the payoﬀ of ﬂ m − m ￿rms coordinating at θt is
equivalent to the payoﬀ, starting with ￿ m active ￿rms, of ﬂ m − ￿ m ￿rms that






















































, for ￿ m ∈ [m, ﬂ m)






< 1 represents the discount factor. Applying Lemma 1 and
2 the following Lemma can be directly proved:




∂ ￿ m < 0, for all ￿ m ∈ [m, ﬂ m);




∂ ￿ m <
0, for all ￿ m ∈ [m, ﬂ m);
3) if we allow t to increase towards T2 (or equivalently ￿ m → m )w e
obtain:
lim




Although for the payoﬀ of a player who coordinates when the other fails
to do so, L(t;T2), we cannot refer directly to the ff(m) function, we are





∂ ￿ m < 0, for all ￿ m ∈ [m+i, ﬂ m);
2) limt→T2−∆T L(t;T2)=FF(T2 − ∆T).
Proof. First, the payoﬀ L(t;T2) is de￿ned for all ￿ m ∈ [m+i, ﬂ m). By (10),
this follows from the de￿nition of T2 − ∆T =i n f ( s>t| θs = θ
∗(m+i)) as
the ￿rst time to which the rivals respond by entering. Second, evaluating
directly the payoﬀ for θt = θ

















































with L(T2 −∆T;T2) ≡ FF(T2 −∆T). As only the ￿rst term on the r.h.s of


































≤ 0 for all ￿ m ∈ [m+i, ﬂ m)
A.3 Proof of proposition 1
Proof. To prove the ￿r s tp a r to fp r o p o s i t i o n1l e t ￿ s￿rst consider the dif-
ference FF(T2 − ∆T) − L(t;T2). This diﬀerence is always positive for all
t ∈ (T1,T2 − ∆T),i . e . f o r ￿ m ∈ (m+i, ﬂ m), and null in T2 − ∆T, i.e. at
￿ m = m+i.
FF(T





















































By Lemma 3, if t tends to T1, i.e. ￿ m → ﬂ m, it follows directly that:
FF(T















= −g(m+i) > 0
44However, if t tends to T2 − ∆T, i.e. ￿ m → m+i, b yL e m m a5w eg e tt h a t
FF(T2 − ∆T) − L(t;T2) tends to zero.
Let￿s now consider the diﬀerence M(t) − L(t;T2).A l s ot h i sd i ﬀerence is
always positive for all t ∈ (T1,T2 − ∆T), i.e. for ￿ m ∈ (m+i, ﬂ m), and null in











































































































On the contrary, if t tends to T2 − ∆T, i.e. ￿ m → m+i, by Lemma 4 M(t) −
L(t;T2) tends to zero. Putting together these results we can, ￿nally, take









∂t [FF(T2 − ∆T) − M(t)] +
∂M(t)
∂t [L(t;T2) − FF(T2 − ∆T)]
[M(t) − L(t;T2)]2 > 0
The proof of the second part follows directly from Lemmas 4 and 5 and
the de￿nition of T2. In fact, T2 →∞as m → 0 and recalling that ￿ m goes
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